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The ACCUs, or Public Order Policing Units,are specialist units tasked to manage publicprotests and major events. Due to the shifting
political climate of the country, and the units’
historically negative status (see the related article in
SA Crime Quarterly No 15 March 2006), public
order policing underwent many necessary legal and
structural changes between 1995 and 2002. 
In 1995 the Internal Stability Division and the Riot
Control Units of the homeland police were merged
under the new SAPS as part of the police’s first
transformation process.1 In 1997 the Public Order
Police Unit was formed and in order to conform to
the country’s newly adopted democratic values,
emphasis was placed on crowd management as
opposed to crowd control. 
In 2002 the units were further refined when the
SAPS Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management
during Gatherings and Demonstrations was
introduced. This document details the regulation of
crowds in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution. Despite the many changes, the units’
sole function continued to be the policing of major
events and protest marches.
This was to change in 2002 when the units’
mandate did an about-turn, with public order police
being tasked to do crime prevention and crime
combating. The change reversed the core
functioning of the units, with public order and
crowd management becoming secondary functions.
The restructuring was cemented by the change in
name from Public Order Policing Units to Area
Crime Combating Units. This served to further
diminish their original purpose, giving crime
fighting more prominence than crowd management. 
The argument put forward in favour of the change
was based on “the decrease in the number and
intensity of major demonstrations, violent marches
and labour unrest since the inception of the new
democracy”.2 Furthermore, the new Public Finance
Management Act 1 of 1999 also demanded ‘value
for money’ budgeting.3
Trends in public protests
Considering that the SAPS’ main reason for
restructuring the units in 2002 was the drop in the
number of protest events, it is worth reviewing the
relevant trends. Data on public protest incidents
since 1997 show that although the number of
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marches did decline up to 2002, the number of
ongoing events was still considerable – significant
enough to warrant specialised attention from the
police. Moreover, the number of incidents has
steadily increased between 2002 and 2005 (Figure 1).
Public events and marches are recorded by the SAPS
on the Incident Registration Information System –
Business Intelligence System (IRIS-BIS). This system
was developed in 1992 and its main purpose has
been to standardise information so that it can be
easily understood and interpreted by all relevant
parties.4 It also serves to replace the manual system of
recording events. 
Since its inception, the system has been reconfigured
and re-classified twice. It has an extensive
classification system, recording incidents in the
following categories: 
• crowd management (peaceful);
• crowd management (unrest); 
• unrest incident (other);
• support; and
• crime prevention. 
The recorded incidence of crowd management
(peaceful and unrest related) shows that public
protests in the country declined from 1998 to 2002
(Figure 1). According to Olivier and Marks, the
substantial increase between 1997 and 1998 can be
attributed to an increase in non-violent incidents
(music festivals, gatherings, processions, political
gatherings, sports gatherings), and the new category
of ‘meetings’ used by the SAPS.5
The trends suggest that it was not unreasonable for
the SAPS management to have decided to revisit the
functioning of the public order policing units in
2001/02, especially when the units could be
effectively utilised for crime prevention and the
implementation of the National Crime Combating
Strategy (NCCS).6 However, despite these decreases,
the total number of incidents remained high, even
though expectations at the time may have been that
under the new democratic government, levels of
public protest would decline. 
Ironically, since the formation of the ACCUs in
2002, with their focus on crime prevention over
crowd management, the number of public protest
incidents has increased steadily, reaching a high of
10,162 events in 2005 (an increase of 50%
between 2002 and 2005). The increase has meant
that the specialist crowd management function of
the ACCUs has become more essential. 
Of even more significance is that the rate of
increase in the last three years has been faster for
violent incidents than for peaceful ones: violent or
unrest crowd incidents increased by 64% between
2002 and 2005, compared to a 49% increase for
peaceful events.
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Figure 1: Total violent and peaceful crowd management incidents, 1997–2005
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Another worrying trend is that, based on an
examination of the issues driving the protests, it
appears that crowd management incidents are likely
to increase in future. The IRIS-BIS database shows
that service delivery and work-related concerns have
been featuring prominently in the majority of public
protests in the last few years. Considering that these
issues are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, it
is to be expected that public protests about these
matters will continue in future. 
The above concerns illustrate the importance of
retaining the specialist skills of the ACCUs. These
can be maintained only if the specialist abilities are
continuously honed. Specialisation suggests the
ability to excel at a particular duty or function with
the benefit of particular technical skills. For the
ACCUs, this entails members working together as a
unit, continuous rigorous training, maintenance and
upgrading of equipment, and strict discipline. It also
means adhering to the principles and laws governing
the unit. 
According to Waddington, the advantages of
specialisation are clear enough: it ensures the
highest standard of competence; officers work
together as a team and come to know each other’s
capabilities and acquire trust in one another so that
they can act as a cohesive unit rather than as a
collection of individuals; their frequent exposure to
operational conditions familiarises them with the
vagaries of actual operations so that they are less
likely to be caught off-guard; and their elite status
raises morale and can become an incentive for
maintaining strict discipline.7 
In essence, this points to the fact that a specialised
unit’s capabilities should not be diluted, especially to
the extent that it runs the risk of losing that
capability. The decentralisation of the public order
policing units to the SAPS area level in 2002,
together with the dual tasks of crime combating and
crowd management, probably weakened the
specialist capacity of the units with regard to
policies, implementation, management and training. 
Proposed restructuring: mid-2006
In mid-2006 the SAPS announced a major
restructuring of the entire organisation, which meant
yet more changes for the ACCUs. The restructuring
was based on evaluations undertaken to explore
factors that were hampering police functioning,
including, among other things, “a duplication of
functions, the impeding of effective command and
control, and slow delivery”.8 In addition, it was
found that “there [were] too many levels of
authority in the police”.9
Currently, the SAPS functions on four levels:
national, provincial, area and station. The planned
restructuring will reduce these to three levels,
eliminating the area level. One of the arguments
made for the restructuring was that it was “in line
with the Constitution”.10 According to the
Constitution, “the national police service must be
structured to function in the national, provincial
and, where appropriate, local spheres of
government.’11 Thus, elimination of the area level
means adherence to the principles of the
Constitution. 
The motivation behind the restructuring is the
strengthening of police stations and the
improvement of service delivery to the public at
station level. Under this arrangement, station
commissioners will be delegated more powers and
will be given additional human and physical
resources to manage. Stations will be clustered in
groups of five or six, and will deal with cross-station
issues and crime problems. 
Each cluster will be supervised by an ‘accounting
station’, which will be determined by the crime
threat analysis. The accounting stations are
basically bigger stations rendering a support service
to the cluster of other stations in their jurisdiction.
The services will include human resources,
financial, administrative, and supply chain
management.
The effect on the ACCUs
There are 43 policing areas nationally with 43
ACCU units (one in each area) with an operational
capacity totalling ±6,300 (excluding civilian and
support personnel).12 The proposed restructuring
would see the 43 areas close down and the ACCUs
deployed to station level.
Gauteng for example, is divided into seven policing
areas: Johannesburg Central, East Rand, North
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Rand, West Rand, Vaal, Pretoria, and Soweto and
includes a total of 122 police stations. The seven
areas will close down and the 122 stations will be
clustered around approximately 25 accounting
stations. Thus, the Johannesburg Central area,
currently responsible for managing 21 stations, will
close down and the 21 stations will be clustered
around approximately four accounting stations. 
The ACCU component in Gauteng consists of
approximately 1,383 operational members.
Johannesburg Central area currently has 179
operational ACCU members. With the restructuring,
approximately 45 operational members will be
deployed to each accounting station. By locating
the ACCUs at the accounting stations, the intention
is that personnel capacity and principles of
teamwork will be maintained, and equipment and
training programmes will be housed under one roof.
Other crime prevention functions performed by
ACCU members will also be managed from these
accounting stations, apart from those managed by
the provincial office.  
The responsibility of the SAPS Operational
Commander of Response Services at the provincial
level will be to implement policy with regards to
public order policing, to plan, coordinate and
mobilise members and cross-station operations, and
to maintain training programmes and equipment of
the public order police. 
The outcome of this new arrangement is to increase
crime prevention support to the stations, to have the
crowd management capacity closer to station level,
to have capacity available for borderline operations,
and to assist detectives in dealing with dangerous
criminals. 
As with most restructuring processes, the above is
not without challenges. Operationally, further
decentralisation of the units could result in a
breakdown of their functioning. In Gauteng, for
example, members will have to be deployed from
25 accounting stations (as opposed to seven at the
moment) to mobilise for an event. The fundamental
principles of specialisation – teamwork and
cohesiveness – may disintegrate because of the
fragmentation of the units. This will then impact on
training of members, and maintaining a full platoon
will be impossible given that capacity is already too
minimal, that members work in shifts, and that some
are away on leave. 
Apart from the above, at the conceptualisation stage
of the restructuring, operational members at
national, provincial and area offices do not appear
to have been consulted about the changes.13
Members on the ground who would be most
affected by the restructuring were not notified about
the process, despite a national communication drive
undertaken by the team responsible for the
restructuring.14 Communication seems to be taking
place via informal channels and members are
concerned that the unit is losing its identity, will be
deskilled and is being shut down. The result is much
uncertainty and low morale among police officials.
Rethinking the restructuring
However, in August 2006 the SAPS team driving the
restructuring process decided, after some
consultation, on a redesign of the ACCUs. 
The new design proposes that a portion of ACCU
members be deployed to do crowd management,
while another portion be tasked to do crime
prevention.15 In Gauteng, for example, of the 1,383
operational members, 614 will be deployed to do
crowd management while approximately 769
members will be deployed to stations to carry out
crime prevention duties. 
The crowd management component will be divided
into three new public order units: Johannesburg,
East Rand and Pretoria.16 The Johannesburg unit will
be based at Diepkloof and will incorporate the
Soweto and West Rand units. This unit will be
allocated 225 operational members. The East Rand
unit will consist of the Vaal and North Rand
operating from Nufield, and will be allocated 187
members. The Pretoria unit will be allocated 202
operational members and operate from Rosslyn. If
more than the existing capacity is required to police
an event in one of the three units’ areas, members
from the other two units will be recruited to assist
with crowd management. 
In terms of crime prevention distribution, not all
police stations in Gauteng will necessarily benefit
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from the additional human resources. Instead,
distribution will be done based on a crime threat
analysis.17 Furthermore, visible policing and other
crime prevention initiatives will be concentrated in
flashpoint areas. 
Challenges of the new design
The restructuring of the ACCUs is still in design
phase. Given this, weaknesses are easily identifiable,
issues may yet be addressed, and conclusions
reached now may be premature. However, the
concerns need articulating for the very reason that
they exist.
The rearrangement of the units (in Gauteng, at least)
translates to three geographically bigger areas that
each public order unit is responsible for, compared
to the seven smaller areas under the previous
arrangement. However, the larger geographical areas
do not come with more operational members. In
fact, of the 1,383 operational members in Gauteng,
only 614 will be retained to do crowd management. 
Thus, the Johannesburg unit, which previously had
197 operational members for one area, now
currently has 215 operational members for a total of
three areas (including West Rand and Soweto).
Whether the allocated 614 members will be
adequate to carry out the crowd management
function remains to be seen. Perhaps the absence of
the crime combating function will make the task
possible, and will alleviate concerns regarding the
deskilling of the specialist function of the units.
The above is of course based on the assumption that
the remaining crowd management members are not
once again drawn into carrying out crime combating
duties. It is also unclear whether the members
allocated to do crime combating duties will also be
utilised for crowd management. Given the broad
purpose that the SAPS hopes to achieve with the
restructuring, it is possible that these members will
be incorporated into visible policing and cease to do
crowd management. 
The issue of responsibility and accountability of the
units is still undecided. The risk exists that if the
units become the responsibility of accounting station
commissioners, members may be used to carry out
crime combating functions. Clearly, the preferred
solution would be that the units are accountable to
the provincial office. This would also remove the
concern of administrative and financial
responsibility, given that it would be standardised
and better managed at the provincial office.
Perhaps the most pressing concern is the status and
placement of current members. Given the separation
of functions, ACCU commanders will have to be re-
allocated positions, operational members will have
to be divided between crowd management or crime
combating positions, and civilian staff will have to
be relocated to new positions. The criteria for
selection and distribution of members will be
challenging. 
Travel and transport of members will have to be
given due consideration, given the tightening up of
the SAPS transport policy.18 State vehicles, previously
used to transport members, will no longer be used
for this purpose. Mobilisation of members at short
notice will also have to be factored in if members
are placed far from their homes. 
All in all, the above concerns have resulted in
discontent and low morale among some members,
which could probably be resolved if communication
is improved. 
Taking the process forward
As with most restructuring processes, the impact of
the proposals will be far-reaching. The ACCUs will
once again revert to being called Public Order
Police. This will mean that members will need to go
through another identity and mindset change. Police
organisations have an intrinsic cultural capital that
does not readily accommodate change.19 How the
units cope with yet another change will be worth
monitoring. 
The difference between the two types of
restructuring proposed this year is clear. While the
mid-2006 design would have been an operational
nightmare, the later design seems better thought out.
If anything, it serves to secure the specialist
component of the units for the time being.
The concern now, however, is that the ACCU’s
capacity is going from being ‘deskilled’ to being
‘depleted’. One wonders at the prominence decision
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makers in the SAPS have attributed the ACCUs,
given that they have to police approximately 
10,000 public protests annually. While their
specialist skills may be restored with the proposed
redesign, it would mean more work for fewer
members. 
As noted, problems of service delivery and public
protests that motivate most protest marches are at an
all-time high, but of more concern is the increase in
violent incidents. The specialist skills of the ACCUs
in handling these events should not be under-
estimated. In order to retain this skill it is vital that
the units undergo continuous, rigorous, training.
Given the challenges of selecting and re-distributing
ACCU members, a panel, consisting of operational
managers and commanders from each area, should
be appointed. This will ensure the retention of the
best members for the crowd management
component, and will help accommodate members’
transport problems. 
If the roles and functions of the two components are
clearly spelled out, tasks previously carried out by
ACCU members such as borderline control, crime
prevention operations, fixed and mobile roadblocks,
guard duties and escort duties, should no longer be
done by the crowd management component of the
public order unit. Instead, the operational members
deployed to do crime combating should incorporate
these functions as part of their new duties.  
The SAPS management were quite artful at the
conceptual phase of the restructuring. The backing
of the police unions was obtained at the outset,
which meant that the door for protests and
grievances was firmly closed. The steadfast support
of the unions is evident from this POPCRU
statement:
It is only logical to expect a handful of some
within the policing fraternity to be unhappy
as a result of this development that will see
them leaving their air-conditioned offices
and revolving chairs to be directly involved
in the war against crime from the most
decisive front, which are the streets of our
country.20
While it is surely the intention of the design team to
act in the best interests of the country as well as
SAPS members, there is currently much uncertainty
and insecurity among ACCU members. SAPS
management has to take cognisance of this and
regularly communicate the process to members in
order to facilitate an easier transition.
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A supporters of Jacob Zuma protest outside the
High Court in Johannesburg, during the ongoing
trial of South Africa's former deputy president.
Zuma, the man once groomed to be South Africa's
next president defended himself against charges
that he raped an HIV-positive family friend and
argued in graphic detail that it was consensual
sexual intercourse. 
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